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Abstract
This paper presents an experimental investigation of strong indirect
reciprocity. We examine both generalized indirect reciprocity (if A helps
B then B helps C) and social indirect reciprocity (if A helps B then C
helps A), in a setting where reciprocal behavior cannot be explained by
strategic motivations. We also consider a treatment for direct reciprocity,
as a benchmark, and use a variant of the strategy method to control for
di®erences in ¯rst movers' actions across treatments. We ¯nd evidence of
strong reciprocity within each treatment, both for strategies and decisions.
Generalized indirect reciprocity is found to be signi¯cantly stronger than
social indirect reciprocity and, interestingly, direct reciprocity. This ¯nd-
ing is interpreted as re°ecting the relevance of ¯rst movers' motivation for
second movers' reciprocal behavior.
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Reciprocity plays an important role in several economic interactions, as these are
often based on the expectation that future bene¯ts will be delivered by another
agent. Given that information asymmetries and monitoring costs can make the
use of enforceable contracts impossible, economic relations often have to based
on implicit contracts whose enforcement is based on reciprocity (see e.g. Fehr et
al., 2002, for a discussion). More generally, reciprocity has long been identi¯ed
in natural and social sciences as an important mechanism in the evolution of
cooperation. If individuals interact repeatedly, reciprocating behaviour can induce
cooperative behaviour even in a population of purely self-interested individuals
(e.g. Hamilton, 1964, Trivers, 1971, Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981, Ridley, 1996,
Friedman, 1971, Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986, Binmore, 1998).
Most research on reciprocal behavior has focused on direct reciprocity in bi-
lateral interactions (if I scratch your back you'll scratch mine). More recently,
indirect reciprocity has also been identi¯ed as an important explanation of co-
operative behavior (e.g. Alexander, 1987, Nowak and Sigmund, 1998, Leimar
and Hammerstein, 2001).1 Two mechanisms of indirect reciprocity can be dis-
tinguished when the interaction also includes a third actor, not involved in the
original exchange. First, social indirect reciprocity, where a kind (or unkind) ac-
tion is reciprocated by a third agent (if I scratch your back someone else will
scratch mine). Second, generalized indirect reciprocity, where a kind (or unkind)
action is reciprocated towards a third agent (if I scratch your back you'll scratch
someone else's).
Most of the existing experimental evidence on indirect reciprocity focuses on
iterated interactions, where there can be a strategic incentive to reciprocate in-
directly (e.g. Wedekind and Milinski, 2000, Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2003,
Seinen and Schram, 2004, Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels, 2004, Greiner and Le-
vati, 2005). Relatively less evidence is available on strong indirect reciprocity
(e.g. Dufwenberg et. al, 2000, Guth et al., 2001), and the results are generally
not conclusive.2 Whether economic behavior is characterized by strong indirect
reciprocity remains an open question. However, indirect reciprocity is indeed an
increasingly widespread and relevant phenomenon in economic and social interac-
tions, since iterated exchanges between partners tend to be replaced by one-shot
interactions between strangers, as in web-based auctions and other forms of e-
commerce.
The objective of this paper is to provide an experimental investigation of both
generalized and social indirect reciprocity in a setting where reciprocal behavior
cannot be explained by strategic motivations. We compare three treatments in a
1See Nowak and Sigmund, 2005, for a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical
literature on indirect reciprocity).
2See also e.g. Fehr and Gachter (2002), Boyd et al. (2003), Carpenter and Matthews (2004),
Brandt et al. (2006) for recent research on altruistic punishment.
2between-subject design: generalized indirect reciprocity, social indirect reciprocity
and, as a benchmark, direct reciprocity. We consider a one-shot gift-exchange
game, using a variant of the strategy method to compare second movers' actions
while controlling for di®erences in senders' actions. We ¯nd evidence of strong
reciprocity within each of the three treatments, both for strategies and actual
decisions. In the comparison between treatments, generalized indirect reciprocity
is found to be signi¯cantly stronger than both social indirect and, quite surpris-
ingly, direct reciprocity. We interpret this result as re°ecting the relevance of ¯rst
movers' extrinsic or intrinsic motivation for second movers' reciprocal behavior.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief critical review
of the existing experimental literature on indirect reciprocity. Section 3 describes
the hypotheses to be tested, and the experimental design and procedures. Section
4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the main ¯ndings
and the implications of the analysis.
2 Measuring Indirect Reciprocity
Reciprocity can be de¯ned as the conditional behaviour to return helpful and
harmful acts in kind, even when this is costly for the reciprocator. Direct reci-
procity refers to a sequential interaction between two agents, and it indicates that
if A helps (harms) B, then B helps (harms) A at his own cost. Note that in
direct reciprocity there is a double coincidence between the ¯rst mover and the
recipient of the reciprocating action, and between the recipient of the ¯rst action
and the reciprocating subject. Indirect reciprocity refers to the conditional be-
haviour to respond to helpful and harmful acts in kind in a sequential interaction
that involves a third agent, so that there is no such double coincidence. Indirect
reciprocity can take two di®erent forms.3
First, cooperative (punishing) behaviour may be based on own prior experi-
ences, in a situation where the reciprocating subject is the recipient of the ¯rst
move, but the ¯rst mover is not the recipient of the reciprocating action. A kind
(or unkind) action can therefore be reciprocated towards a third agent, not in-
volved in the original interaction: if A helps (harms) B, then B helps (harms) C.
We refer to this form of reciprocity as generalized indirect reciprocity:4
De¯nition 1 Positive (negative) generalized indirect reciprocity is a behavior
to adopt a helpful (harmful) action towards someone else, at one's own material
cost, because some other person's intentional behaviour was perceived to be helpful
(harmful) to oneself.
3Nowak and Sigmund (2005) de¯ne \upstream reciprocity" reciprocal behavior based on prior
experiences and \downstream reciprocity" reciprocal behavior based on reputation.
4Rutte and Taborsky (200x) and Pfei®er et al. (2004) use the term generalize reciprocity
to describe individuals who base cooperative behaviour on prior experiences, irrespective of the
identity of their partners.
3Second, cooperative (punishing) behaviour may be based on reputation, in a
situation where the ¯rst mover is the recipient of the reciprocating action, but the
reciprocating subject is not the recipient of the ¯rst move. A kind (or unkind)
action can therefore be reciprocated by a third agent, not involved in the original
interaction: if A helps (harms) B, then C helps (harms) A. We refer to this form
of reciprocity as social indirect reciprocity:5
De¯nition 2 Positive (negative) social indirect reciprocity is a behavior to adopt
a helpful (harmful) action towards someone else, at one's own material cost, be-
cause that person's intentional behaviour was perceived to be helpful (harmful) to
some other person.
In repeated interactions, reciprocal behaviour can be strategic, if it is moti-
vated by the expectation of positive net bene¯ts in the long run. This applies not
only to direct reciprocity but also, for di®erent reasons, to both types of indirect
reciprocity. Similarly to direct reciprocity, social indirect reciprocity opens the
way to strategic reputation building. Self-interested individuals who would oth-
erwise not act cooperatively, might do so in order to increase the probability of
being reciprocated by a third party. Reputation can provide a strong mechanism
to sustain cooperation, even when the group size is large. Generalized indirect
reciprocity may lead to cooperation because previous interactions with anony-
mous partners provide information about the overall level of cooperation within
the group. The expected future bene¯ts from cooperation can outweigh the im-
mediate costs for the reciprocator in interactions within small groups, although
this strategic incentive tends to disappear as the group size increases (Boyd and
Richerson, 1989, Pfei®er et al., 2005).
In one-shot interactions, in the absence of expected future bene¯ts of costly
reciprocating actions, reciprocity cannot be strategic. Strong reciprocity can be
de¯ned as the conditional behaviour to return helpful and harmful acts in kind,
even when this is costly and provides neither present nor future net bene¯ts for the
reciprocator (see Gintis, 2000, Bowles and Gintis, 2001, Fehr et al., 2002). Strong
reciprocity applies not only to direct reciprocity, but also to both generalized
and social indirect reciprocity. In the remainder of this section we brie°y review
the economic experimental literature on indirect reciprocity. While most of this
literature considers settings where there can be a strategic incentive to reciprocate
indirectly, relatively less evidence is available on strong indirect reciprocity.
Social indirect reciprocity has been analyzed extensively in experiments based
on the repeated helping game, developed by Nowak and Sigmund (1998).6 Helping
decisions are generally shown to be signi¯cantly a®ected by the information about
5Carpenter and Matthews (2004) de¯ne (negative) social reciprocity as \the act of demon-
strating one's disapproval, at some personal cost, for the violation of widely-held norms".
6The game involves a series of asymmetric single-stage helping games based on random
pairing in large groups. Within pairs, donors are given the opportunity of giving a certain
amount of money to the recipient, having some information about the past actions of their
4number of times the recipient has given and kept in the past (image score). Evi-
dence for strategic reputation building is also found in many experiments: helping
rates rise if agents know that their action will a®ect their own reputation.7 Social
indirect reciprocity thus provides an important mechanism for sustaining cooper-
ative behavior in iterated interactions.
Wedekind and Milinski (2000) report evidence of social indirect reciprocity in
a helping game repeated over six rounds. They ¯nd that donors are more likely
to give to those who have been generous in the past, so that image scoring can
signi¯cantly promote cooperation. Seinen and Schram (2004) ¯nd strong evidence
of social indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment involving random
pairing in large groups with a large number of rounds. Helping decisions are
signi¯cantly a®ected by the information about previous decisions of the recipients.
It should be noted, however, that these results can at least partially be attributed
to direct reciprocity, given that subjects interact repeatedly with the opponents
chosen randomly from a group of 14 over 90 rounds.8
Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels (2005) investigate cooperation among strangers
with limited information about reputation, focusing on the e®ects of di®ering types
of recursive information: no information on image score, ¯rst order information
and second order information.9 In the no-information treatment the donor chooses
without knowing the receiver's history. In the ¯rst order information treatment
the donor knows whether the receiver helped when last in the role of donor. In the
second order information treatment the donor also knows whether the receiver last
helped someone who last helped or did not help. Subjects are matched in pairs for
each of fourteen rounds, knowing that no two subjects are matched together more
than once, so that any reciprocal behavior is necessarily indirect. The main results
of the analysis are that not only providing information about partners' immediate
past action increases cooperation, but also providing recursive information about
the action of partners' previous partners further promotes cooperation.
Engelmann and Fischbacher (2002) investigate indirect reciprocity and strate-
gic reputation building in a similar repeated helping experiment. In their experi-
mental design, in any period only half of the players have a public image score, and
therefore have a strategic incentive to help. This allows to distinguish between
strategic indirect reciprocity and strong indirect reciprocity. They ¯nd evidence
of strong indirect reciprocity, but also clear evidence of strategic reputation build-
ing: the average helping rate of donors with a public score is more than twice the
receiver. To eliminate the confounding e®ects of direct reciprocity, players should know that
their recipients will never be their donors in future interactions.
7The propensity to help is also generally higher in earlier rounds, when reputation has a
higher impact on future earnings.
8Subjects were actually told that the group size was twice the actual size. As a consequence,
as observed by Bolton et al. (2005), the extent to which the results truly re°ect indirect
reciprocity depends on what subjects believed about the rematch probability.
9Subjects are randomly matched in pairs for each of 14 rounds, so that no two subjects are
ever matched together more than once. Each player is mover or receiver half of the times.
5average helping rate of donors without image score.
Carpenter and Matthews (2004) test for the existence of social reciprocity in a
public goods experiment where players are allowed to monitor the decisions made
by other players and punish them at a cost (Fehr and Gachter, 2002, Boyd et al.,
2003, Brandt et al., 2006). To distinguish between social reciprocity, intended as a
normative response, and other punishment explanations they consider a treatment
in which players could monitor and sanction other members of their group, and
a treatment in which players could monitor and punish members of other groups.
Although the norm violation motivation for punishing outside the own group is
weaker, the experimental evidence con¯rms the existence of social reciprocity.
A relatively smaller number of experiments have focused on generalized indi-
rect reciprocity, showing that players who have just received a donation are more
likely to give a donation in turn.10 Greiner and Levati (2005) analyze general-
ized indirect reciprocity in trust games played in a chain of n players. In their
experiment, subjects have information only about what has been given to them,
without information on the person they must send to or any other individual in
their group. The authors repeat the game a ¯nite number of times and vary the
rematching procedure, distinguishing a partners condition and a strangers con-
dition, where players should not have an incentive to play strategically.11 They
also consider a condition where all players decide simultaneously, knowing the
amount the received in the previous round, in addition to the one where they
play consecutively, knowing the amount they received in the same round. The
group size is varied, to check the hypothesis that indirect reciprocity is stronger
in smaller groups. The main result is that, although strategic considerations and
group size do matter, generalized indirect reciprocity can enhance cooperation in
cyclical networks.
Dufwenberg et al. (2001) examine strong indirect reciprocity using a variant
of the trust game, as in Berg et al. (1995). One treatment is based on a stan-
dard trust game aimed at capturing direct reciprocity. In the indirect reciprocity
treatment, subjects interact in groups of four (two donors and two receivers),
with crossing sender-responder pairs. Instead of repaying his own sender, as in
the direct reciprocity treatment, each responder can only return money to the
other sender (without knowing the amount transferred by that sender). There-
fore, responders can only reciprocate towards the other donor (generalized indirect
reciprocity).12 The results indicate that direct reciprocity produces higher dona-
10See Boyd and Richardson (1989) and Pfei®er et al. (2004) for theoretical analyses.
11It should be observed that in the strangers sessions, although new groups of 3 players were
formed in each of the 40 repetitions, this does not rule out the possibility to be matched twice
with the same player. Indeed, matching groups were further restricted in order to increase
the number of independent observations, although participants were not informed about such
restrictions.
12In a third treatment, the authors allow for private information of donors about the factor
by which donations are multiplied. This allows to distinguish between intrinsically motivated
donors and those who are only interested in an image of generosity.
6tions by senders on average, but these are poorly rewarded by responders. Rates
of return by respondents are higher in the generalized indirect reciprocity treat-
ment. More speci¯cally, the interest rate is positive only in the case of indirect
reciprocity, whereas it is negative in both direct reciprocity treatments, although,
the di®erence is not statistically signi¯cant. In this paper reciprocity is measured
in terms of return rates, de¯ned as ri =
yi
xi ¡1 or ri =
yi
xj ¡1 for direct and indirect
reciprocity, respectively. However, average return rates do not provide an appro-
priate measure of reciprocity, given that they could be re°ecting unconditional
behaviour.13
Guth et al. (2001) examine strong indirect reciprocity in a similar setting. A
standard investment game with direct reciprocity is used as a control treatment.
In the indirect reciprocity treatment (Indirect reward Full Information), each
responder can only return money to the other sender, instead of repaying his own
sender as in the direct reciprocity treatment, knowing both the amount sent by his
own sender and the amount sent by the other sender.14 The main di®erence with
respect to Duwfenberg et al. (2001) is that here reciprocating subjects also know
what their recipients did in the ¯rst stage. The results indicate that investments
are strongly reduced when indirect reward is compared with direct reward. It
is important to observe that, given the features of the experimental design, the
indirect reciprocity treatment does not allow to distinguish between generalized
and social indirect reciprocity. Both motives may be driving responders, given
that they may respond to the amount received and, at the same time, to the
amount sent in the ¯rst stage by they person they are responding to.
3 The experiment
3.1 Design
The experiment is based on three treatments in a between-subject design: direct
reciprocity, indirect generalized reciprocity and indirect social reciprocity. In all
treatments subjects interact in groups of four: A1, A2, B1 and B2. They play
a two-stage gift-exchange game (e.g. Fehr et al. 1993, Gachter and Falk, 2002),
where all subjects have the same endowment of 20 tokens. In the ¯rst stage, A1
(A2) must choose the amount a1 (a2), an integer between 0 and 20, she wants to
send to player B1 (B2); the amount sent is subtracted from the payo® of A1 (A2),
13The ¯nding that the average interest rates is higher in the generalized indirect reciprocity
treatment could indeed be explained by the fact that all receivers are unconditionally less altru-
istic in the direct reciprocity treatment (possibly because they take into account the extrinsic
motivation of senders).
14A third treatment is a slightly modi¯ed version of the direct reciprocity treatment, where the
interaction between pairs is purely informational. Each receiver is informed of the amounts sent
by both senders. This allows to assess whether direct reciprocity is in°uenced by information
about investments received by other second movers (social comparison).
7multiplied by 3 by the experimenter, and added to the payo® of B1 (B2). In the
second stage, players B1 and B2 must choose the amount (an integer between 0
and 20) they want to send to players A1 and A2. The details of stage 2 di®er in
the three treatments:
1. In the direct reciprocity treatment (DIR), Bi is informed of the amount
she received from Ai in stage 1 and must choose the amount bi, an integer
between 0 and 20, she wants to send to Ai; the amount sent is subtracted
from the payo® of Bi, multiplied by 3 by the experimenter, and added to
the payo® of Ai.
2. In the indirect generalized reciprocity treatment (IRG), Bi is informed of
the amount she received from Ai in stage 1 and must choose the amount bi,
an integer between 0 and 20, she wants to send to Aj; the amount sent is
subtracted from the payo® of Bi, multiplied by 3 by the experimenter, and
added to the payo® of Aj.
3. In the indirect social reciprocity treatment (IRS), Bi is informed of the
amount sent by Aj in stage 1 and must choose the amount bi, an inte-
ger between 0 and 20, she wants to send to player Aj; the amount sent is
subtracted from the payo® of Bi, multiplied by 3 by the experimenter, and
added to the payo® of Aj.
Total payo®s are 20 ¡ ai + 3bi for player Ai and 20 ¡ bi + 3ai for player Bi in
DIR, and 20 ¡ ai + 3bj for player Ai and 20 ¡ bi + 3ai for player Bi in IRG and
IRS. For each player the minimum and maximum potential payo®s are 0 and 80
tokens, respectively.
In stage 2 we applied a variant of the strategy method (henceforth SM): player
B had to provide a response for each feasible action of player A, before being
informed of the actual choice of A. This allowed us to study the responses to each
possible action of A and, therefore, to distinguish between unconditional altruism
and conditional altruism (positive reciprocity) in the strategies of B players.
After providing a response for each feasible action of player A, players B were
informed of the actual action taken by A and had to choose a response (decision
method, henceforth DM). Before players B made their choices with the two meth-
ods (SM and DM), all players were informed that payo®s would be determined
on the basis of one of the two methods, to be selected randomly by publicly toss-
ing a coin. After players B had made their decisions in both SM and DM, the
method to determine the payo®s was selected on the basis of the outcome of the
coin toss.15 This procedure based on responses by players B in both strategy and
decision method allowed us to compare the consistency between the strategies of
B players and their actual responses. It also allowed us to ensure that players
15See Fischbacher et al. (2001) for a similar approach.
8A could choose their action in stage 1 knowing that in stage 2 players B would
choose their action having been informed of the actual action taken by A in stage
1.
3.2 Procedures
We run two sessions for each treatment, with 24 subjects participating in each
session, for a total of 96 subjects. In each of the four sessions, subjects were
randomly assigned to a computer terminal at their arrival and, before the game
started, to their role as A or B (each subject only played one role). In order
to ensure public knowledge, instructions were distributed and read aloud (see
Appendix 1). Sample questions were distributed to ensure understanding of the
experimental procedures. Answers were privately checked and, if necessary, ex-
plained to the subjects, and the experiment did not start until all subjects had
answered all questions correctly.
The experiment was conducted in the Experimental Economics Laboratory of
the University of Milan Bicocca in November 2007. Participants were undergrad-
uate students of Economics recruited by e-mail using a list of voluntary potential
candidates. Sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes. No show-up fee was paid
and the exchange rate between was 2 tokens per euro. The average payment was
about 14 euros, and payments ranged between 0 and 40 euros. The experiment
was run using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999).
3.3 Hypotheses
If subjects are purely self-interested and rational, players B will choose to give zero
tokens in all treatments, since they are second movers and gift-giving is costly. If
subjects A expect all subjects B to be purely self-interested, by backward induc-
tion the optimal choice of players A is also to give zero in stage one. Therefore,
under the assumption that rationality is common knowledge, in all treatments the
subgame perfect equilibrium is for all players to give zero.
If the behavior of subjects B is characterized by positive strong reciprocity,
so that they reward kind actions even if this is costly and cannot be strategic,
the response of subjects B depends positively on the amounts sent by subjects
A. This provides the ¯rst null hypothesis, the absence of strong reciprocity, to be
tested within each of the three treatments:
H1a
H0 : ½DIR = 0
H1 : ½DIR > 0
9H1b
H0 : ½IRG = 0
H1 : ½IRG > 0
H1c
H0 : ½IRS = 0
H1 : ½IRS > 0
where ½ is the correlation between the amounts sent by subjects A and the
corresponding amounts sent by subjects B within each treatment. Note that our
operational de¯nition of reciprocity is based on Spearman correlation coe±cients,
rather than Pearson correlations, so as to avoid restricting the attention to linear
dependence. Nevertheless, in order to enable a comparison of the two indicators,
in presenting the results we will also report Pearson correlation coe±cients.
Turning to the main objective of the analysis, we compare the strength of
reciprocating behaviour across the three treatments. In particular, we test the
hypothesis that direct reciprocity is stronger than both generalized and social in-
direct reciprocity, given that only in the former there is a \double coincidence" of
roles. We also compare the two indirect reciprocity treatments and test the hy-
pothesis that outcomes are more important than intentions for eliciting reciprocal
behaviour, so that social indirect reciprocity (where the payo® of the reciprocator
is not a®ected by the ¯rst mover's action) should be less strong than generalized
indirect reciprocity (where the payo® of the ¯rst mover is not a®ected by the
reciprocator's action):
H2a
H0 : ½DIR = ½IRG
H1 : ½DIR > ½IRG
H2b
H0 : ½DIR = ½IRS
H1 : ½DIR > ½IRS
H2c
H0 : ½IRG = ½IRS
H1 : ½IRG > ½IRS
10Note that if subjects A can expect with positive probability subjects B to
display strong reciprocity, then the predictions for subjects A would di®er across
treatments. In particular, subjects A should send more in the DIR treatment
than in the IRG treatment and, although to a lesser extent, more in the IRS
treatment than in the IRG treatment, since they might be motivated by the trust
that a reciprocating response (direct or indirect, respectively, in the two cases)
could increase their own payo®. This strategic motivation for subjects A is instead
absent in the IRG treatment. The expected di®erences in the behavior of ¯rst
movers lead us to focus our analysis of reciprocal behavior on the responses of
players B in strategy method. This allows us to compare the three treatments
while keeping constant the sending behavior of players A. Nevertheless, we also
analyse reciprocity in the actual responses of players B (decision method) in order
to provide a check of the consistency between strategies and decisions.
4 Results
Figure 1 displays average amounts sent in tokens, by treatment, for subjects A
and B in both SM and DM. Table 1 reports the corresponding ¯gures, while also
providing mean and median contributions for each input level in strategy method.
The average amounts sent by A players are 7.6, 6.3 and 7.5 tokens in the DIR,
IRG and IRS treatments, respectively. This suggests that strategic motivations
do play a role for subjects A, as the amount they send is lowest when strategic
motivation is absent (IRG), and highest when reciprocity can be expected to be
stronger (DIR), although the di®erences are relatively small.
The average amounts sent by B players in decision and strategy method are 5.3
and 6.4 in the DIR treatment, 3.9 and 8.4 in the IRG treatment and 3.6 and 4.6
in the IRS treatment. These ¯gures are consistent with the hypothesis of strongly
reciprocal behavior: focusing on the decision method, where B players respond to
di®erent amounts sent by A's, the average response by subjects B is higher in the
treatment where A's input is higher (DIR). Once di®erences in sending behavior
by A's are controlled for, responses by players B are highest in IRG and lowest in
IRS: the average amounts sent by B players in strategy method are 6.4 in DIR,
8.4 in IRG and 4.6 in IRS. A similar pattern applies to median values.
Table 1
Table 2 reports Mann-Whitney tests of the hypothesis that contributions are
the same across pairs of treatments, versus the two-sided alternative that they
are di®erent, based on 24 independent observations. The results indicate that the
di®erences between treatments are not statistically signi¯cant for subjects A and
for subjects B in decision method. However, there are signi¯cant di®erences in the
amounts sent by subjects B in strategy method. In particular, the amounts sent in
IRG are signi¯cantly higher than those in both DIR and IRS, whereas di®erences
11between DIR and IRS are not statistically signi¯cant. This result holds both on
aggregate (averaging over all 21 possible actions by subject A) and for responses
to individual actions by subjects A.16
Table 2
Result 1: The amounts sent by subjects B in IRG are signi¯cantly
higher than those in DIR and IRS, both on average and by individual
amount received.
Figures 2 and 3 further illustrate these results by comparing across treatments
mean and median responses by B subjects in strategy method for each possible
action of A subjects. Average responses in DIR and IRG are very similar up to
about 5 tokens sent by subject A. Thereafter, average contributions in the two
treatments diverge, as they remain on a steeply rising trend in IRG, whereas
they rise at a signi¯cantly lower rate in DIR. Contributions in IRG are instead
systematically lower for all possible amounts sent by A's. A similar pattern applies
to median contributions, displayed in ¯gure 3, where the di®erence between IRG
and DIR is even more pronounced and the one between DIR and IRS relatively
small.
Figures 2-3
We now turn to the test of hypothesis 1 (strong reciprocity within treatments).
Table 3 reports correlations between the responses of subjects B and the amounts
sent by subjects A, within each treatment, and the corresponding p-values for the
null hypothesis of zero correlation. If we consider responses in strategy method,
Spearman correlation coe±cients are positive and strongly signi¯cant within each
of the three treatments (0.35, 0.64 and 0.49 for the DIR, IRG and IRS treatments,
respectively).17 Similar results are obtained for Pearson correlation coe±cients
(0.37, 0.65 and 0.50). These results clearly indicate that players B's strategies are
characterized by reciprocity.
Table 3
It could be observed that reciprocal behavior might have been to some extent
induced, or enhanced, by the use of the strategy method: given that players B
are faced with a choice for each of the feasible actions of players A, this might
arti¯cially lead to stronger reciprocity than if players B were to make only one
choice, in response to the single actual decision made by A. It is also possible,
16For aggregate responses in strategy method, we computed the average amount sent by each
B player and tested the null hypothesis of no di®erence between treatments on 24 independent
observations.
17We computed individual correlation coe±cients by pairs of subjects, and tested the null
hypothesis of zero correlation using a sign test based on 24 independent observations.
12more generally, that given that only one of the 21 feasible actions by players A has
actually been chosen, the strategy pro¯le of players B as expressed in their SM
choices does not represent how they would respond to the actual choice of player
A. We therefore also report, in table 3, correlation coe±cients for the responses
of players B to the actual amounts sent by players A (decision method), for each
of the three treatments. The correlation coe±cients are, as in the previous case,
positive and strongly signi¯cant within each of the two treatments, and are indeed
larger than in the case of SM responses (0.57, 0.47 and 0.56 for the DIR, IRG
and IRS treatments, respectively). Similar results apply to Pearson correlation
co±cients.
Result 2: The null hypothesis of no reciprocity can be strongly re-
jected within each of the three treatments, both for strategies and
actual decisions.
The results in table 3 provide a qualitative indication that reciprocity is elicited
di®erently in the three treatments. We therefore turn to formal tests of hypothesis
2. We start by analyzing aggregate behavior using regression analysis, to then
examine reciprocating behavior at individual level.
Table 4 reports the results obtained by regressing the response of B players
on A players' action, in either DM or SM, using observations from all three treat-
ments. Parameter estimates are obtained by OLS, test statistics are based on
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, with errors clustered on pairs of sub-
jects for equations estimated on SM observations.
Table 4
In the ¯rst speci¯cation, observations from all three treatments are pooled
together and common parameters are estimated separately for DM and SM. The
results, reported in columns (1) and (2), indicate that, averaging over all treat-
ments, the coe±cient measuring reciprocity is similar across decisions and strate-
gies (0.48). Next, we also include dummy variables and interaction terms (amount
sent by A players multiplied by the treatment-speci¯c dummy) for each of the
two indirect reciprocity treatments. This allows us to assess the di®erences in
reciprocating behavior between the two treatments at the aggregate level. While
there are no signi¯cant di®erences across treatments in the estimates for decisions
(column 3), the estimates for strategies, reported in columns (4), show that the
coe±cient for the IRG interaction term is positive and signi¯cant at the 5 per
cent level. The coe±cient for the IRS interaction term is instead negative and
not signi¯cant. This indicates that reciprocal behavior is signi¯cantly stronger in
IRG than in DIR and, a fortiori, than in IRS.
Result 3: On aggregate, reciprocity is signi¯cantly stronger in the
IRG-treatment than in the IRS-treatment and the DIR-treatment.
13Since subjects B had to provide a response for each feasible action of players A,
we can also study di®erences in reciprocating behavior between the two treatments
at individual level. Table 5 reports Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests of the null
hypothesis that correlation coe±cients are the same across pairs of treatments,
against the relevant one-sided alternative. The results lead to rejection of the null
hypothesis of equal median at the 5 per cent signi¯cance level in the comparison
between DIR and IRG and at the 10 per cent signi¯cance level in the comparison
between DIR and IRS.
Table 5
Result 4: At individual level, reciprocity is signi¯cantly stronger
in the IRG-treatment than in both the IRS-treatment and the DIR-
treatment.
In order to help interpret this result, ¯gures 4 to 6 display the histogram and
the corresponding cumulative distributions of the individual amounts sent, by
treatment, for players A and for players B in both SM and DM.
Figures 4-6
Finally, we check the robustness of the results by examining whether there
are any systematic di®erences in how subjects respond in strategy and decision
method. Table 6 reports regression results for the relationship between B players'
actual decisions and their strategies: responses in DM are regressed on responses
in SM corresponding to the same amount given by A. As above, we also include
dummy variables and interaction terms (amount sent by A players multiplied
by the treatment-speci¯c dummy) for each of the two indirect reciprocity treat-
ments, either individually (columns 1 and 2) or jointly (column 3). Strategies
explain about 55 per cent of the overall variability of decisions of subjects B.
The coe±cient for strategies is about 0.7 and statistically signi¯cant in all treat-
ments. The coe±cients of the interaction terms indicate that, relative to the DIR
treatment, decisions follow strategies more closely in the IRS-treatment (0.13)
and less closely in the IRS treatment (-0.04). However, these di®erences between
treatments are not statistically signi¯cant.
Table 6
5 Discussion
This paper presented an experimental investigation of strong indirect reciprocity,
in a setting where reciprocal behavior cannot be explained by strategic moti-
vations. We compared generalized indirect reciprocity, social indirect reciprocity
and, as a benchmark, direct reciprocity. We used a variant of the strategy method
14to compare second movers' actions while controlling for di®erences in senders' ac-
tions. The results provide several challenges to the paradigm of rationality that
dominates economics.
Within treatments, we found evidence of non-strategic reciprocal behavior not
only for direct reciprocity, but also for social and generalized indirect reciprocity.
The ¯nding of social indirect reciprocity in the absence of iterated interactions
supports the existing evidence from repeated helping games, indicating that rep-
utation provides an e®ective incentive for cooperative behavior of self-interested
individuals for whom it is not in their short-term interest to cooperate. The ¯nd-
ing of strong generalized indirect reciprocity indicates that reciprocal cooperation
is not necessarily based on speci¯c knowledge about the partner's kindness, but
any prior experience of cooperation may be relevant.
Between treatments, generalized indirect reciprocity is found to be signi¯cantly
stronger not only, as expected, than social indirect reciprocity but, quite surpris-
ingly, than direct reciprocity. One possible explanation for this ¯nding is based
on how agents evaluate the kindness of an action and, more speci¯cally, the idea
that the motivation of an action may be relevant for its perceived kindness. If an
action is perceived to be more kind when intrinsically rather than extrinsically
motivated, reciprocity should be stronger in response to actions that can only be
driven by intrinsic motivation, than to actions that can also be driven by extrin-
sic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985, Deci et al., 2000).18 In our experiment, the
responder's willingness to cooperate in the direct reciprocity treatment may be
crowded out by the extrinsic motivation of the sender, which is instead absent in
the generalized indirect reciprocity.
Overall, our results suggest several implications and directions for future re-
search on reciprocity and cooperation. First, at the empirical level, experimental
and ¯eld evidence of direct reciprocity could be interpreted in terms of gener-
alized reciprocity. More generally, empirical studies should attempt to identify
what determines the perceived kindnesss of an action in determining of recipro-
cal behavior. Second, at the theoretical level, reciprocity cannot be explained by
models that focus only on the outcomes of the actions one is responding to. Theo-
retical models of reciprocal behavior should also take into account intentions and,
in particular, consider explicitly the type of motivation driving an action. Finally,
theoretical approaches attempting to explain cooperation in an evolutionary con-
text should pay more attention to the potential role of generalized reciprocity.
Generalized reciprocity may represent a more general mechanism leading to coop-
eration than direct and indirect reciprocity, which require individual recognition
and speci¯c social memory.
18Focusing on direct reciprocity, Stanca et al. (2007) ¯nd that reciprocal behavior is signif-
icantly stronger when extrinsic motivation can be ruled out, a result that extends the concept
of motivational crowding-out from within subject to between subjects.
156 Appendix: Instructions
This appendix reports the instructions distributed on paper to the subjects for
the indirect reciprocity treatments (IRG and IRS). We indicate in brackets parts
that are speci¯c to a given treatment.
Instructions [common to all treatments]
² Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment.
² During the experiment you are not allowed to talk or communicate in any
way with other participants. If at any time you have any questions raise
your hand and one of the assistants will come to you to answer it.
² By following the instructions carefully you can earn an amount of money
that will depend on your choices and the choices of other participants.
² At the end of the experiment the number of tokens that you have earned will
be converted in euros at the exchange rate 2 tokens = 1 euro. The resulting
amount will be paid to you in cash.
General rules
² There are 24 subjects participating in this experiment.
² In the experiment you will interact in a group of 4 subjects.
² You will not be informed about the identity of the other subjects in your
group, nor will they be informed about yours.
How players interact
² The four subjects in your group will be randomly assigned to one of four
roles: A1, A2, B1, and B2.
² Each subject will receive an endowment of 20 tokens.
² The experiment will take place in 2 phases.
PHASE 1
² A1 chooses how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send to B1. At the
same time, A2 chooses how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send to B2.
² We will triple the amount sent, so that B1 and B2 will receive 3 times the
tokens sent by A1 and A2, respectively.
16PHASE 2
² (IRG) In phase 2 B1, informed of the amount that she received from A1
in stage 1 will choose how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send to A2.
At the same time B2, informed of the amount that she received from A2 in
stage 1 and will choose how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send to A1.
² (IRS) In phase 2 B1, informed of the amount that A2 sent to B2 in stage 1
and will choose how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send to A2. At the
same time B2, informed of the amount that A1 sent to B1 in stage 1, will
choose how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send to A1.
² We will triple the amounts sent, so that A2 will receive 3 times the tokens
sent by B1 and A1 will receive 3 times the tokens sent by B2.
² The experiment will end. Overall earnings for each subject will be deter-
mined as the sum of the earnings obtained in the two phases:
{ A1: 20 tokens minus the tokens she sent to a B1 in phase 1 plus 3 times
the tokens sent to her by B2 in phase 2.
{ A2: 20 tokens minus the tokens she sent to a B2 in phase 1 plus 3 times
the tokens sent to her by B1 in phase 2.
{ B1: 20 tokens plus 3 times the tokens sent to her by A1 in phase 1
minus the tokens she sent to A2 in phase 2.
{ B2: 20 tokens plus 3 times the tokens sent to her by A2 in phase 1
minus the tokens she sent to A1 in phase 2.
Instructions ON SCREEN - phase 1
² You are A1. You have to decide how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to
send to B1. We will triple the amount sent, so that A2 will receive 3 tokens
for each token you send.
² (IRG) In phase 2 B1 will be informed of the amount that she received from
you in stage 1 and will choose how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send
to A2.
² (IRS) In phase 2 B2 will be informed of the amount that you sent to B1 in
stage 1 and will choose how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to send to you.
Instructions ON SCREEN - phase 2
² You are B1. You have to decide how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to
send to A2. We will triple the amount sent, so that A2 will receive 3 tokens
for each token you send.
17² (IRG) Your choice will be made with two di®erent methods:
{ Method 1: before being informed of how many tokens A1 actually sent
you in phase 1, you have to decide how many tokens to send to A2 for
each of the possible amounts that A1 could have sent to you in phase
1 (0;1;:::;20 tokens). Since there are 21 possible cases, you have to
make 21 choices.
{ Method 2: after being informed of how many tokens A1 actually sent
you in phase 1, you have to decide how many tokens you want to send
to A2.
² After you have made your choice with both methods, earnings will be de-
termined on the basis of one of the two methods, selected randomly.
{ If method 1 is selected, of the 21 choices that you had made, only the
one corresponding to the actual decision of A1 will be used to determine
the earnings.
{ If method 2 is selected, the single choice that you had made will be
used to determine the earnings.
² (IRS) Your choice will be made with two di®erent methods:
{ Method 1: before being informed of how many tokens A2 actually sent
to B2 in phase 1, you have to decide how many tokens to send to A2 for
each of the possible amounts that she could have sent to B2 in phase 1
(0;1;:::;20 tokens). Since there are 21 possible cases, you have to make
21 choices.
{ Method 2: after being informed of how many tokens A2 actually sent
to B2 in phase 1, you have to decide how many tokens you want to
send to A2.
² After you have made your choice with both methods, earnings will be de-
termined on the basis of one of the two methods, selected randomly.
{ If method 1 is selected, of the 21 choices that you had made, only the
one corresponding to the actual decision of A1 will be used to determine
the earnings.
{ If method 2 is selected, the single choice that you had made will be
used to determine the earnings.
The experiment will end and overall earnings for each subject will be deter-
mined as the sum of the earnings obtained in phase 1 and in phase 2.
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21Table 1: Mean and median amounts sent in tokens, by treatment
Means Medians
DIR IRG IRS DIR IRG IRS
Subject A 7.63 6.29 7.54 6.50 4.50 10.00
Subject B - DM 5.29 3.92 3.63 1.50 2.50 4.00
Subject B - SM all subjects 6.41 8.43 4.57 4.00 8.00 3.00
Subject B - SM 0 1.88 1.38 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 1 2.42 2.08 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 2 2.92 2.79 1.25 1.50 2.00 1.00
Subject B - SM 3 3.50 3.75 1.46 2.50 3.00 1.00
Subject B - SM 4 4.25 4.67 1.88 4.00 4.00 2.00
Subject B - SM 5 4.21 4.83 2.88 3.00 5.00 2.50
Subject B - SM 6 5.25 6.25 2.96 4.50 6.00 3.00
Subject B - SM 7 5.46 6.92 3.58 4.00 7.00 3.50
Subject B - SM 8 5.75 8.13 3.88 4.00 8.00 3.50
Subject B - SM 9 5.88 7.92 4.50 4.50 9.00 4.50
Subject B - SM 10 6.46 9.04 5.04 5.50 10.00 5.00
Subject B - SM 11 7.29 9.96 5.08 5.50 11.00 5.00
Subject B - SM 12 6.96 10.17 5.54 6.00 10.00 5.00
Subject B - SM 13 7.04 10.75 5.92 6.00 12.50 5.00
Subject B - SM 14 7.54 11.38 6.42 6.00 13.50 5.50
Subject B - SM 15 8.96 11.92 6.88 8.00 15.00 5.50
Subject B - SM 16 9.25 12.17 7.17 9.00 14.00 5.50
Subject B - SM 17 9.58 11.96 7.33 8.00 14.50 5.50
Subject B - SM 18 9.67 13.25 7.63 9.00 16.50 6.00
Subject B - SM 19 10.17 13.54 7.92 9.50 17.50 6.50
Subject B - SM 20 10.25 14.25 7.63 9.50 18.50 6.00
Note: Means and medians are calculated over 24 individual observations within each treatment
(504 observations for SM all subjects).
22Table 2: Test for di®erences in contributions between treatments
IRG-IRS DIR-IRS DIR-IRG
U-test P-value U-test P-value U-test P-value
Subject A -1.20 0.23 -0.31 0.75 0.97 0.33
Subject B - DM 0.06 0.95 0.08 0.94 -0.19 0.85
Subject B - SM 3.40 0.00 0.94 0.35 -2.04 0.04
Subject B - SM 0 2.33 0.02 0.92 0.36 -1.37 0.17
Subject B - SM 1 3.14 0.00 1.26 0.21 -1.68 0.09
Subject B - SM 2 2.97 0.00 0.82 0.41 -1.96 0.05
Subject B - SM 3 3.66 0.00 1.24 0.22 -1.97 0.05
Subject B - SM 4 3.94 0.00 1.72 0.09 -1.91 0.06
Subject B - SM 5 2.66 0.01 0.44 0.66 -2.21 0.03
Subject B - SM 6 3.70 0.00 1.34 0.18 -1.80 0.07
Subject B - SM 7 3.71 0.00 0.98 0.32 -2.08 0.04
Subject B - SM 8 3.89 0.00 1.02 0.31 -2.28 0.02
Subject B - SM 9 3.16 0.00 0.65 0.52 -2.19 0.03
Subject B - SM 10 2.86 0.00 0.61 0.54 -2.03 0.04
Subject B - SM 11 3.30 0.00 1.21 0.23 -1.61 0.11
Subject B - SM 12 2.88 0.00 0.65 0.52 -1.97 0.05
Subject B - SM 13 3.08 0.00 0.51 0.61 -2.17 0.03
Subject B - SM 14 3.00 0.00 0.42 0.68 -2.11 0.03
Subject B - SM 15 2.98 0.00 1.00 0.32 -1.51 0.13
Subject B - SM 16 2.77 0.01 0.85 0.39 -1.53 0.13
Subject B - SM 17 2.34 0.02 0.96 0.34 -1.33 0.18
Subject B - SM 18 2.89 0.00 0.76 0.45 -1.58 0.11
Subject B - SM 19 2.78 0.01 0.75 0.45 -1.41 0.16
Subject B - SM 20 2.98 0.00 0.69 0.49 -1.46 0.14
Note: Mann-Whitney test statistics are based on 24 independent observations for each treat-
ment. P-values refer to the relevant two-sided hypothesis. For strategies on aggregate (third
row), we computed the average amount sent by each B player and tested the null hypothesis of
no di®erence between treatments over 24 independent observations.
23Table 3: Strong reciprocity within treatments
Strategies Decisions
DIR IRG IRS DIR IRG IRS
Spearman correlation 0.35 0.64 0.49 0.57 0.47 0.56
P-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Pearson correlation 0.37 0.65 0.50 0.53 0.59 0.53
P-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Note: For responses in strategy method we computed individual correlation coe±cients by pairs
of subjects, and tested the null hypothesis of zero correlation, against the relevant one-sided
alternative, using a sign-test based on 24 independent observations.
Table 4: Regressions of B's responses to A's actions (SM, DM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DM SM DM SM
Tokens sent by A 0.48** 0.48** 0.61** 0.42**
(4.19) (10.67) (2.71) (4.95)
Tokens sent by A * IRG dummy -0.20 0.22*
(-0.67) (1.98)
Tokens sent by A * IRS dummy -0.23 -0.02
(-0.98) (-0.17)
IRG treatment dummy 0.69 -0.19
(0.29) (-0.15)
IRS treatment dummy 0.14 -1.66
(0.07) (-1.38)
Constant 0.88 1.62** 0.64 2.24*
(1.05) (3.73) (0.31) (1.93)
R2 0.28 0.23 0.31 0.31
Number of observations 72 1512 72 1512
Note: The dependent variable is the response by subjects B. Coe±cients are estimated by OLS,
t-statistics reported in brackets. Test statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors, with errors clustered on pairs of subjects for equations estimated on SM observations. *
indicates p<0.05, ** indicates p<0.01.
24Table 5: Test for di®erences in reciprocity between treatments
IRG-IRS DIR-IRS DIR-IRG
Spearman correlations - U-test 1.42 -0.76 -1.74
Spearman correlations - P-value (0.08) (0.22) (0.04)
Pearson correlations - U-test 1.26 -1.10 -1.88
Pearson correlations - P-value (0.11) (0.14) (0.03)
Note: the ¯gures reported are Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests of the null hypothesis that
correlation coe±cients are the same across pairs of treatments. P-values refer to the relevant
one-sided hypothesis (see section 3).
Table 6: Regressions of B's responses on B's strategies
(1) (2) (3)
B's strategy 0.76** 0.71** 0.73**
(8.28) (8.32) (6.89)
B's strategy * IRG-treatment dummy -0.07 -0.04
(-0.42) (-0.23)
IRG-treatment dummy -0.98 -1.27
(-0.78) (-0.88)
B's strategy * IRS-treatment dummy 0.14 0.13
(0.64) (0.55)
IRS-treatment dummy -0.08 -0.74
(-0.06) (-0.53)
Constant 1.12 0.74 1.40
(1.71) (1.06) (1.51)
R2 0.56 0.54 0.54
Number of observations 72 72 72
Note: OLS estimates. t-statistics reported in brackets (heteroskedasticity-robust standard er-
rors). * indicates p<0.05, ** indicates p<0.01.
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